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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the minimization of the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), a
most preferable risk measure in ﬁnancial risk management, in the context of the well-known
single-period news-vendor problem which is originally formulated as the maximization of
the expected proﬁt, or the minimization of the expected cost. We show that downside
risk measures including the CVaR are tractable in the problem due to their convexity, and
consequently, under mild assumptions on the probability distribution of product’s demand,
we provide analytical solutions or linear programming formulation of the minimization of
the CVaR measures deﬁned with two diﬀerent loss functions. Numerical examples are also
shown to clarify the diﬀerence among the models analyzed in this paper.
Keywords: news-vendor problem, conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), downside risk, mean-
risk model, convex optimization
1 Introduction
Suppose that everyday, facing uncertain demand on a certain product whose value will decrease
by the next day, a manager has to decide how many quantities of the product should be ordered.
The classical news-vendor model oﬀers a solution to this situation by maximizing the daily
expected proﬁt or, equivalently, minimizing the daily expected cost of the product.
In the literature, however, it has been pointed out that maximizing the expected proﬁt is
not satisfactory from practical point of view, and managers in the real world are more concerned
with the other objectives. For example, some try to attain a predetermined target proﬁt as much
as possible. However, such a criterion is still insuﬃcient because it may result in an unacceptably
large loss. To reduce such a risk arising from the variation of the proﬁt, some researchers propose
to minimize the standard deviation of the proﬁt (e.g., [9]), which originates from Markowitz [10].
On the other hand, it is natural that proﬁt above some target level is not regarded as a risk to
be hedged, but more pleasant gain. From this viewpoint, minimizing a downside risk measure
which captures a risk of the proﬁt going down to some target level, is more appealing than
the other risk measures such as the standard deviation. In the literature of the news-vendor
framework, many researchers consider to minimize such downside risk measures as alternatives
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to the expected proﬁt maximization. For example, several researches including Lau [9] and
Lau-Lau [7] examine a model which maximizes the probability of exceeding a predetermined
ﬁxed target proﬁt, whereas Parlar-Weng [13] considers the expected proﬁt in place of the ﬁxed
target. These objectives are very intuitive, but the related optimization problem has no convex
structure, and accordingly, they are very tough to handle for general distribution functions.
Besides, these models seek higher proﬁt, whereas a possibility of suﬀering great loss is not
considered.
In this paper, we adopt another type of downside risk measure which is called the conditional
value-at-risk (CVaR) in ﬁnancial risk management, to the single-period news-vendor situation.
The CVaR is known as a risk measure which is coherent ([2]), and consistent with the second
(or higher) order stochastic dominance ([14, 12]). These preferable properties are induced from
some axiomatization of rational investor’s behavior under uncertainty, and thus, these are also
valid to a manager who faces uncertain proﬁt/loss situation as in the news-vendor problem.
In particular, the consistency with the stochastic dominance implies that minimizing the CVaR
never conﬂicts with maximizing the expectation of any risk-averse utility function ([12]). On the
other hand, some researchers directly treat the risk-aversion through the news-vendor’s utility
function (see Eeckhoudt et al.[3], for example). In practice, utility function is, however, too
conceptual to identify and thus, the use of risk measures has advantage over that of utility
functions.
Moreover, the lower partiality of the CVaR plays an important role in preserving the concav-
ity of the proﬁt or, equivalently, the convexity of the cost. In ﬁnancial portfolio management as
in [17], the return from an asset portfolio is often represented as a linear function of the portfolio
which is to be determined. This is why the standard deviation results in a convex quadratic
function. On the contrary, the proﬁt in the news-vendor problem is a nonlinearly concave func-
tion of the order quantities. Consequently, minimizing the standard deviation of the proﬁt may
turn into a nonconvex optimization, though many researchers introduce it in order to capture
the proﬁt variation (e.g., [9]) and develop a CAPM by following the modern portfolio theory
(e.g., [1]). In this paper, we show that downside risk measures preserve the concavity of the
proﬁt function by virtue of their lower partiality, and the resulting risk minimization becomes a
convex program.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we review the well-known
results of the classical single-period news-vendor problem in which only single product is con-
sidered, and deﬁne the total cost of a news-vendor as well as the proﬁt. In Section 3, the CVaR
is introduced in a general form by following [17], and two types of CVaRs are deﬁned by intro-
ducing diﬀerent loss functions which are called the net-loss and the total cost. By exploiting
the formulation developed in [17], we can achieve closed form solutions of the unconstrained
minimization of the two diﬀerent CVaRs. In Section 4, we extend the analysis into the mean-
risk framework in which the trade-oﬀ between maximizing the proﬁt and minimizing the risk is
considered. When only single product is considered without any constraint, closed form solution
or simple numerical solution method is derived. On the other hand, when multiple products
with many constraints should be dealt with, the problems can be reformulated into equivalent
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linear programs. This fact helps managers analyze the mean-risk trade-oﬀ structure in a more
practical setting with numerous linear constraints. Also, some numerical examples are presented
to clarify the diﬀerence among the models analyzed in this paper. Finally, we close this paper
with some concluding remarks.
2 News-Vendor Problem in Single Period
In this section, we brieﬂy summarize the classical single-period news-vendor problem for later
comparisons with our results.
2.1 Notation
First of all, let us introduce notation used in this paper as follows:
N : index set for products, N := {1, 2, ..., n}, where n := |N |
ξi : daily demand for product i (random variable), ξi ∈ IR+
qi : selling price per unit for product i (given)
ci : cost per unit for product i (given)
ri : salvage value per unit for product i (given)
si : shortage penalty per unit for product i (given)
xi : daily order quantity for product i (decision variable).
We assume the following condition through the paper:
Assumption 2.1 ri < ci < qi, si ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
In the following, we omit the subscript for simplicity when only single product is considered.
2.2 Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization
With ﬁxed x, the daily proﬁt gained from each product is a random variable deﬁned by
P(x, ξ) := qmin { ξ, x }+ rmax {x− ξ, 0 } − smax { ξ − x, 0 } − c x, (1)
where the third term in the right-hand side represents an artiﬁcial penalty for opportunity cost,
and s is often set to be 0.
Let F (η) denote the distribution function of demand of the product, i.e., F (η) := P {ξ ≤ η}.
We note that F (0) = 0. The classical news-vendor model then maximizes the expected proﬁt:
maximize
x
µ(x) := E [P(x, ξ)] =
∫ ∞
0
P(x, ξ) dF (ξ), (2)
where E[·] is the mathematical expectation under the distribution F . When the inverse of the
distribution function exists, an optimal solution of Problem (2) is obtained by solving ∂µ∂x = 0,
as
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
)
, (3)
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where E := c− r, and U := q + s− c. Even when F does not have the inverse, one can obtain
a solution via a simple numerical calculation ([18]).
On the other hand, the daily total cost is deﬁned by
Q(x, ξ) := E [x− ξ]+ + U [ξ − x]+, (4)
where [Y ]+ := max{Y, 0}. Here, the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (4) represents the cost
for excess order, while the second does the opportunity cost. By noting the relation
P(x, ξ) = V ξ −Q(x, ξ),
where V := q − c = U − s, the minimization of the expected cost is proved to be equivalent to
the maximization of the expected proﬁt:
min
x
E [Q(x, ξ) ] = V E [ ξ ] − max
x
E [P(x, ξ) ] .
Since E,U > 0 from Assumption 2.1, the expected cost is a convex function of x, whereas the
expected proﬁt is concave one, and therefore, both problems are so-called convex program.
In the case where multiple products are considered, we additionally assume that the total
proﬁt (or cost) is just the sum of the ones from each product, i.e., letting P(x, ξ) and Q(x, ξ)
denote the total proﬁt and cost, respectively, we assume
Assumption 2.2 P(x, ξ) = ∑
i∈N
P(xi, ξi); Q(x, ξ) =
∑
i∈N
Q(xi, ξi).
3 Minimization of CVaR in the News-Vendor Problem
In this section, we introduce the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) for general distribution func-
tions by following Rockafellar-Uryasev [17], and show that the CVaR minimization leads to a
convex problem when the associated loss is represented as a convex function. Also, we examine
the parameter sensitivity of its solution.
3.1 Conditional Value-at-Risk and Its Convexity
Let L(x, ξ) denote the magnitude of the loss which is a random variable for ﬁxed x, and let us
denote the distribution function of L by Φ(η |x) := P {L(x, ξ) ≤ η}. Here, any variable to be
minimized can be adopted as the loss L, and we will apply two diﬀerent functions as the loss in
the succeeding sections.
For β ∈ [0, 1), we deﬁne the β-VaR of the distribution by αβ(x) := min {α |Φ(α|x) ≥ β }.
By deﬁnition, we can expect that the loss L exceeds αβ only in (1− β)× 100%.
Rockafellar-Uryasev [17] introduces the β-tail distribution function to focus on the upper
tail part of the loss distribution as
Φβ(η |x) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
0 for η < αβ(x),
Φ(η |x)− β
1− β for η ≥ αβ(x).
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Using the expectation operator Eβ[·] under the β-tail distribution Φβ, we deﬁne the β-conditional
value-at-risk of the loss L by φβ(x) := Eβ [L(x, ξ) ]. Denoting the expectation under the original
distribution Φ by E[·], the following relation shown in [17]:
E[L(x) | L(x) ≥ αβ(x) ] ≤ φβ(x) ≤ E[L(x) | L(x) > αβ(x) ] (5)
implies that φβ is approximately equal to the conditional expectation of L which exceeds the
threshold αβ with ﬁxed x.
In order to minimize φβ(x), Rockafellar-Uryasev [17] introduces a simpler auxiliary function
Fβ : IRn+1 → IR, deﬁned by
Fβ(x, α) := α +
1
1− βE
[
[L(x, ξ)− α]+ ] , (6)
and shows that Fβ is convex with respect to α. Also, they provide a shortcut to minimizing
φβ(x) as
minimize
  ∈ X
φβ(x) = minimize
( , α) ∈ X × IR
Fβ(x, α), (7)
where X ⊂ IR a feasible region. This relation shows that the minimal value φβ(x∗) can be
achieved by minimizing the function Fβ(x, α) with respect to x ∈ X and α ∈ IR simultaneously.
Furthermore, it is shown in [17] that, with an optimal solution (x∗, α∗) of the right-hand side
optimization problem, x∗ is an optimal solution of the left-hand side one, and α∗ is almost (or
sometimes exactly) equal to αβ(x∗).
In the following, we consider two diﬀerent loss functions as L: one is deﬁned by −P(x, ξ)
and called the net loss of the proﬁt, while the other one is the total cost Q(x, ξ). For the two
loss functions, we can show that the corresponding CVaR becomes a convex function.
Proposition 3.1 ([17]) The function (6) is convex if the loss function L(·, ξ) from IRn to
(−∞,∞] is convex.
Proof. See [17]. 
Since both the net loss, −P(·, ξ), and the total cost, Q(·, ξ), are convex functions with ﬁxed
ξ under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, the CVaR minimization problems using these functions are
convex. In the following, we call them the net-loss CVaR minimization and the total cost CVaR
minimization, respectively.
It is worth noting that this proposition is also valid for a class of downside risk measures
including the below-target return deﬁned by E[[t − P(x, ξ)]+] for ﬁxed target t ∈ IR ([4]), and
maximal loss maxξi −R(x, ξ) when ξ has ﬁnite supports ([19]).
Proposition 3.2 ([15]) Let g be a convex function from IRn to (−∞,∞], and let γ be a convex
function from (−∞,∞] to (−∞,∞] which is non-decreasing with γ(∞) = ∞. Then, h(x) =
γ(g(x)) is convex on IRn.
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Figure 1: Nonconvexity of Standard Deviation of P
Proof. See [15], for example. 
From this proposition, we see that minimization of any non-decreasing convex risk measure is
formulated as a convex problem, and at the same time, the lower partiality of the risk measures
seems crucial for the convexity in the risk minimization for the news-vendor problem. In fact,
the variance (or equivalently, the standard deviation) of the net loss or the cost function can
have a non-convex structure. Figure 1 shows an example of the non-convexity with respect to x
of the standard deviation of proﬁt P in the two-product case where the underlying distribution
has ﬁnite supports.
3.2 Unconstrained Minimization of CVaR for Single Product
In this subsection, we consider the case dealing with only single product without constraint,
i.e., X = IR, and present analytical results of the CVaR minimization problems with two loss
functions. In addition, let us assume for simplicity that there exists the inverse of the distribution
function F , and let us denote its density by f .
a) The Net-Loss CVaR Minimization First, we deﬁne the net-loss by −P, and adopt it
as the loss function L, so that a manager can consider the proﬁt lower than αβ.
The minimization of (6) with L = −P is represented as the following convex program:
minimize
x ∈ IR, α ∈ IR p(x, α) := α +
1
1− β
∫ ∞
0
[−P(x, ξ)− α ]+ f(ξ) dξ. (8)
Note that the integral part of the objective in (8) can be expanded as∫ x
0
[−{V ξ − E (x− ξ ) } − α ]+ f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
x
[−{V ξ − U ( ξ − x ) } − α ]+ f(ξ) dξ. (9)
Then, consider the following three cases (see Figure 2):
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0
Figure 2: Three Cases in Minimization of Net-Loss CVaR
〈〈 case 1. α < −V x 〉〉 The integral part (9) becomes
∫ x
0
[−{V ξ − E (x− ξ ) } − α ] f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
x
[−{V ξ − U ( ξ − x ) } − α ] f(ξ) dξ.
From the ﬁrst-order condition of Problem (8), one has a solution (x∗, α∗) satisfying x∗ =
F−1
(
U
E+U
)
and α∗ < −V x∗, only when one sets β = 0.
〈〈 case 2. α ∈ [−V x,Ex) 〉〉 When s > 0, the integral part (9) becomes
∫ Ex−α
E+V
0
[−{V ξ − E (x− ξ ) } − α ] f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
Ux+α
U−V
[−{V ξ − U ( ξ − x ) } − α ] f(ξ) dξ,
while the second integral vanishes when s = 0. From the ﬁrst-order condition, one has a
solution (x∗, α∗) deﬁned by
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗ =
E + V
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
+
U − V
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
,
α∗ =
E (U − V )
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
− U (E + V )
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
.
It is easy to see that this solution (x∗, α∗) satisﬁes α∗ ∈ [−V x∗, Ex∗) under Assumption
2.1. Also, we note that this x∗ includes the solution in the previous case when β = 0.
〈〈 case 3. α ≥ Ex〉〉 When s > 0, the integral part (9) becomes
∫ ∞
Ux+α
U−V
[−{V ξ − U ( ξ − x )} − α ] f(ξ) dξ,
while the integral part is 0 and, thus the problem has no bounded solution when s = 0.
By diﬀerentiating this equation, we observe that this case has no optimal solution.
Here, we summarize the discussion above.
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Proposition 3.3 Assume that there exists the inverse of the distribution function of the product
demand. Then, the problem (8) with β ∈ [0, 1) has an optimal solution (x∗, α∗) defined by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗ =
E + V
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
+
U − V
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
,
α∗ =
E (U − V )
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
− U (E + V )
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
.
(10)
In particular, when β = 0, any α∗ with α∗ ≤ −V x∗ also satisfies optimality.
In particular, when the artiﬁcial penalty s is set to be 0, i.e., V = U , one has the following
result:
Corollary 3.4 Under the same assumption as in Proposition 3.3 with s = 0, one has an optimal
solution (x∗, α∗) defined by
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
( 1− β )
)
; α∗ = −Ux∗. (11)
In particular, when β = 0, any α∗ with α∗ ≤ −Ux∗ also satisfies optimality.
From these proposition and corollary, we see that the diﬀerence between the solution x∗ given
by (10) or (11) and the classical one (3) depends on two parameters s and β. In particular, from
Corollary 3.4, we see that it is only the coeﬃcient in the argument of the inverse F−1 when
s = 0, whereas when s > 0, it may be much more complex. However, this CVaR minimization
gives a simple generalization of the classical problem since the solution with β = 0 is equal to
that for the classical one with any s ≥ 0. This consequence is consistent with the deﬁnition of
the β-CVaR.
b) The Total Cost CVaR Minimization Next, we consider the total cost Q as the loss L.
By minimizing the β-CVaR deﬁned on the total cost, a manager may avoid an unduly large cost
which consists of the excess order cost and the opportunity cost.
The corresponding problem is then represented as
minimize
x ∈ IR, α ∈ IR q(x,α) := α +
1
1− β
∫ ∞
0
[Q(x, ξ)− α ]+ f(ξ) dξ. (12)
Similarly to the previous discussion, we consider three cases by taking into account that the
integral part of the objective in (12) can be transformed into∫ x
0
[E (x− ξ )− α ]+ f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
x
[U ( ξ − x )− α ]+ f(ξ) dξ. (13)
We can calculate this integral by considering the following three cases (see Figure 3).
〈〈 case 1. α < 0 〉〉 The integral part (13) becomes∫ x
0
{E (x− ξ )− α } f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
x
{U ( ξ − x )− α } f(ξ) dξ.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of Problem (12), one has a solution (x∗, α∗) satisfying
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E+U
)
and α∗ < 0, only when one sets β = 0.
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0
Figure 3: Three Cases in Minimization of Total Cost CVaR
〈〈 case 2. α ∈ [0, Ex) 〉〉 The integral part (13) becomes
∫ x− α
E
0
{E (x− ξ )− α } f(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
x+ α
U
{U ( ξ − x )− α } f(ξ) dξ.
From the ﬁrst-order condition, one has a solution (x∗, α∗) deﬁned by
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗ =
E
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
+
U
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
,
α∗ =
EU
E + U
(
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
− F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
))
.
We note that this x∗ includes the solution in the previous case when β = 0.
〈〈 case 3. α ≥ Ex 〉〉 The integral part (13) becomes
∫ ∞
x+ α
U
{U ( ξ − x )− α } f(ξ) dξ.
By diﬀerentiating this equation, we observe that this case has no optimal solution.
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 Assume that there exists the inverse of the distribution function F of the
product demand ξ. Then, the problem (12) with β ∈ [0, 1) has an optimal solution (x∗, α∗)
defined by⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗ =
E
E + U
F−1
(
U( 1− β )
E + U
)
+
U
E + U
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
,
α∗ =
EU
E + U
(
F−1
(
Eβ + U
E + U
)
− F−1
(
U( 1 − β )
E + U
))
.
(14)
In particular, when β = 0, any α∗ with α∗ ≤ 0 also satisfies optimality.
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Figure 4: Optimal Solutions of CVaR Minimization with Two Loss Functions
By comparing solutions (10) and (14) of the two CVaR minimization, we observe that the
solution (x∗, α∗) of the total cost CVaR minimization (12) can be far diﬀerent from that of
the net-loss CVaR minimization (8), which does not holds in the classical problem in which
maximizing the proﬁt and minimizing the cost are equivalent (see the results in Section 2).
However, this CVaR minimization (12) also provides a generalization of the classical maximizing
proﬁt model because this solution with β = 0 is the same as the solution (3), which is consistent
with the deﬁnition of the β-CVaR.
Figures 4 (a) to (d) illustrate the diﬀerences among the three optima (3), (10) and (14)
when s is set to be 10, i.e., V = U − 10, and ξ follows a normal distribution under a couple of
parameter settings. Noting that the solution with β = 0 is equal to the classical one (3), we see
from Figures 4 (a) to (d), that the net-loss CVaR minimization implies less order quantity than
the classical one and the diﬀerence becomes larger as β gets higher, while the optimal solution
of the total cost CVaR depends on parameters E and U . In particular, when E = U holds as in
(a), the solution (14) is independent of β, and accordingly, equal to the classical solution, and
when E < U holds as in (c) and (d), two solutions with diﬀerent loss show reverse trends with
β. From Figures 4 (c) and (d), we see that the the diﬀerence between two solutions becomes
smaller as the variance of normal distribution decreases.
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3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Here, we analyze the parameter sensitivity of the solutions obtained so far. Table 1 summarizes
the sign of the partial derivative of the optimal solution x∗ with respect to parameters, q, c, r, s
and β. From this table, we see that all the signs of the sensitivity to c, r and s remain the same
as that of the classical model, whereas those to β and q can diﬀer from model to model.
The signs of ∂x
∗
∂β for the net-loss and the total cost CVaR minimization depend on the
underlying distribution because for the net-loss CVaR minimizer (10) with s = U − V > 0, one
has
∂x∗
∂β
=
1
(E + U )2
(
E(U − V )
f (F−1(G2))
− U(E + V )
f (F−1(G1) )
)
,
where G1 =
U( 1−β )
E+U and G2 =
Eβ+U
E+U , and for the total cost CVaR minimizer (14), one has
∂x∗
∂β
=
E U
(E + U )2
(
1
f (F−1(G2 ))
− 1
f (F−1(G1) )
)
.
To illustrate how the shape of distribution aﬀects the derivatives, let us consider the S-D distri-
bution ([6]) whose distribution and density functions are deﬁned, respectively, by
F (η) =
{
d− { ( a− η )/b } 1l , for η ∈ [H1, a),
d + { ( η − a )/b } 1l , for η ∈ [a,H2],
and
f(η) =
1
b l
∣∣∣∣ a− ηb
∣∣∣∣
1−l
l
, for H1 ≤ η ≤ H2,
where a, b, d, l,H1 and H2 are constant with b > 0, l > 0 and d ∈
[
{(a−H1)/b}1/l , 1− {(H2 − a)/b}1/l
]
.
For the net-loss CVaR minimizer, one then has
∂x∗
∂β
< 0 for l = 1,
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂x∗
∂β
≥ 0 if d ∈ [(1− ν)G1 + νG2, (1− θ)G1 + θG2)
∂x∗
∂β
≤ 0 if d < (1− ν)G1 + νG2 or d ≥ (1− θ)G1 + θG2
(for l > 1),
and ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂x∗
∂β
≥ 0 if d ∈ [(1− θ)G1 + θG2, (1− ν)G1 + νG2)
∂x∗
∂β
≤ 0 if d < (1− θ)G1 + θG2 or d ≥ (1− ν)G1 + νG2
(for 0 < l < 1),
where ν := B1/(1−l)/(B1/(1−l)− 1), θ := B1/(1−l)/(B1/(1−l) +1) and B := U(E+V )E(U−V ) . On the other
hand, for the total cost CVaR solution, one has
∂x∗
∂β
= 0 for l = 1,
∂x∗
∂β
> 0 if d <
G1 + G2
2
;
∂x∗
∂β
≤ 0 if d ≥ G1 + G2
2
(for l > 1),
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Table 1: Sign of Partial Derivative of Each Minimizer
∂x∗
∂q
∂x∗
∂c
∂x∗
∂r
∂x∗
∂s
∂x∗
∂β
net-loss CVaR (s = 0) (11) + − + 0 −
net-loss CVaR (s > 0) (10) case-by-case − + + case-by-case
total cost CVaR (14) + − + + case-by-case
Classical (3) + − + + 0
and
∂x∗
∂β
≥ 0 if d ≥ G1 + G2
2
;
∂x∗
∂β
< 0 if d <
G1 + G2
2
(for 0 < l < 1).
From the above results, we see that the sensitivity with respect to β depends on the param-
eters determining the shape of the S-D distribution. In particular, the skewness parameter d is
crucial for the solutions above. Also, we can see that the sign of the derivative with respect to
q of the net-loss CVaR minimizer with s > 0 depends only on parameters d and l.
4 Mean-CVaR Models and LP Formulation
Since the Markowitz’s seminal work, the trade-oﬀ between risk and return has been considered
in various situations by using mathematical optimization techniques. This trade-oﬀ model is
known as the mean-risk model (see [11], for example), which is formulated as the optimization
of a composite objective consisting of the expected return and a certain risk measure ρ(x):
maximize
 
E [P(x, ξ) ]− λρ(x)
subject to x ∈ X,
(15)
where X a convex set representing some constraints on the portfolio x, and λ ≥ 0 a trade-
oﬀ parameter, or the minimization of the risk while the return is kept at least as large as a
predetermined target:
minimize
 
ρ(x)
subject to E [P(x, ξ) ] ≥ µ,
x ∈ X,
(16)
where µ is the minimum level of the expected proﬁt. It is known that the both formulations
give the same eﬃcient frontier, which is a graph of Pareto eﬃcient pairs of expected return and
some risk measure ρ, when the expected return is a concave function of x while the risk is a
convex one. Exploiting the results in the previous section and applying this framework to the
news-vendor problem by using the CVaR measures φβ as the risk ρ, the corresponding mean-risk
models (15) and (16) with ρ(x) = φβ(x) are convex programs, and consequently, result in the
same eﬃcient frontier.
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4.1 Unconstrained Mean-CVaR Models for Single Product
a) Mean-Net-Loss CVaR Model First, we consider the unconstrained mean-risk model
using the net-loss CVaR for single-product case as in the previous section. The problem is then
represented by
maximize
x, α
∫ ∞
0
P(x, ξ) f(ξ) dξ − λ
(
α +
1
1− β
∫ ∞
0
[−P(x, ξ) − α ]+ f(ξ) dξ
)
. (17)
By the same reasoning in the net-loss CVaR minimization, we consider the following three
cases. Throughout the below analysis (except for propositions), we omit the case of λ = 0, since
the mean-risk model is equal to the proﬁt maximization (2).
〈〈 case 1. α ≤ −V x 〉〉 Let h(x) := µ(x) − λ p(x, α). Since one has the following ﬁrst-order
condition:⎧⎨
⎩
∂h
∂x = −
(
1 + λ1−β
)
{(E + U )F (x)− U} = 0
∂h
∂α = −λ
(
1− 11−β
)
= 0,
(18)
only when β = 0 holds, one has a solution (x∗, α∗) satisfying (3) and α∗ ≤ −V x∗.
〈〈 case 2. α ∈ (−V x,Ex) 〉〉 When s > 0, we have the ﬁrst-order condition:
⎧⎨
⎩
E
{
F (x) + λ1−βF
(
Ex−α
E+V
)}
+ U
{
F (x) + λ1−βF
(
Ux+α
U−V
)}
= U
(
1 + λ1−β
)
,
F
(
Ux+α
U−V
)
− F
(
Ex−α
E+V
)
= β.
Then, an optimal α is given by
α∗ = Ex∗ − (E + V )F−1(A(x∗) ), (19)
where x∗ solves the equation:
(E + V )F−1(A(x)) + (U − V )F−1(A(x) + β)− (E + U )x = 0, (20)
where A(x) := 1−βλ
{
U
E+U ( 1 + λ )− F (x)
}
.
〈〈 case 3. α ≥ Ex 〉〉 We have a solution (x∗, α∗) deﬁned by
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
(1 + λ)
)
; α∗ = (U − V )F−1(β)− U x∗. (21)
Considering the condition α ≥ Ex, β and λ should satisfy the relation
F−1
(
U
E + U
(1 + λ)
)
≤ U − V
E + U
F−1(β). (22)
Therefore, for λ > 0 and s > 0, we can ﬁnd an optimal solution through the following steps:
1. If β = 0, then (x∗, α∗) satisfying (3) and α∗ ≤ −V x∗ is a solution.
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2. If β and λ satisfy the relation (22), then (x∗, α∗) satisfying (21) is an optimal solution.
3. Otherwise, search x satisfying Equation (20), and α deﬁned by (19).
In particular when we assume s = 0, we can obtain a closed form solution of Problem (17),
by similar discussion to the ﬁrst one in the previous section.
Proposition 4.1 For s = 0, β ∈ [0, 1) and λ ≥ 0, the mean-CVaR model (17) has an optimal
solution (x∗, α∗) defined by
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
· 1 + λ
1 + λ ( 1 − β )−1
)
; α∗ = −Ux∗.
In particular, when λ = 0 or β = 0 holds, any α∗ with α∗ ≤ −U x∗ also satisfies optimality.
Moreover, for λ ∈ [0, E+UE β − 1), a solution (x∗∗, α∗∗) defined by
x∗∗ = F−1
(
U − λE
E + U
)
; α∗∗ = E x∗∗ − (E + U )F−1( 1− β )
also achieves the optimal value. In this case, so does a solution (xˆ, αˆ) satisfying xˆ = (1− t)x∗+
t x∗∗ and αˆ = (1− t)α∗ + t α∗∗ for any t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. When s = 0 holds, we consider the following three cases.
〈〈 case 1. α < −Ux 〉〉 Noting that s = 0 is equivalent to U = V , we have the same result with
the general one.
〈〈 case 2. α = −Ux 〉〉 From the ﬁrst-order condition, we have a solution (x∗, α∗) deﬁned by
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
· 1 + λ
1 + λ1−β
)
; α∗ = −U x∗.
〈〈 case 3. α > −Ux 〉〉 By exploiting Proposition 3.3, we have a solution deﬁned by
⎧⎨
⎩ x
∗ = F−1
(
U−λE
E+U
)
,
α∗ = E x∗ − (E + U )F−1(1− β).
Combining with the condition α∗ > −Ux∗, this is valid only for λ < E+UU β− 1. Note that
the optimal solution set is convex since the problem is convex, then the result follows. 
b) Mean-Total Cost CVaR Model The analysis of the mean-risk model using the total cost
CVaR can be conducted in a similar manner. For single product case, the model is formulated
as follows:
maximize
x, α
∫ ∞
0
P(x, ξ) f(ξ) dξ − λ
(
α +
1
1− β
∫ ∞
0
[Q(x, ξ) − α ]+ f(ξ) dξ
)
. (23)
In this analysis, we omit the trivial case of λ = 0.
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〈〈 case 1. α ≤ 0 〉〉 By similar discussion to the case 1 in the proof for Proposition 3.5, only
when β = 0 holds, one has a solution (x∗, α∗) satisfying (3) and α∗ ≤ 0, since one has the
ﬁrst-order condition (18).
〈〈 case 2. α ∈ (0, Ex) 〉〉 We have the ﬁrst-order condition:
⎧⎨
⎩ E
{
F (x) + λ1−βF
(
x− 1Eα
)}
+ U
{
F (x) + λ1−βF
(
x + 1U α
)}
= U
(
1 + λ1−β
)
,
F
(
x + 1U α
)− F (x− 1Eα) = β.
Then, an optimal α is given by
α∗ = E
{
x∗ − F−1(A(x∗) )} , (24)
where x∗ solves the equation:
E F−1(A(x)) + U F−1(A(x) + β)− (E + U )x = 0. (25)
〈〈 case 3. α ≥ Ex 〉〉 We have a solution (x∗, α∗) satisfying
x∗ = F−1
(
U
E + U
(1 + λ)
)
; α∗ = U F−1(β)− U x∗. (26)
Considering the condition α ≥ Ex, β and λ should satisfy the relation
F−1
(
U
E + U
(1 + λ)
)
≤ U
E + U
F−1(β). (27)
Therefore, for λ > 0, we can ﬁnd an optimal solution through the following steps:
1. If β = 0, then (x∗, α∗) satisfying (3) and α∗ ≤ 0 is a solution.
2. If β and λ satisfy the relation (27), then (x∗, α∗) satisfying (26) is an optimal solution.
3. Otherwise, search x satisfying Equation (25), and α deﬁned by (24).
4.2 Constrained Mean-CVaR Models for Multiple Products
In this subsection, we address how to compute an optimal solution when multiple products are
considered with multiple constraints which are given as a system of linear inequalities.
Suppose that the probability distribution is given by a ﬁnite number of scenarios. Let K de-
note a ﬁnite set of scenarios, and let P{ξ = ξk} = pk for k ∈ K where ξk := (ξk,1, ξk,2, ..., ξk,n).
Moreover, X is supposed to be a polytope given by X := {x |Cx ≤ b } where C ∈ IRm×n and
b ∈ IRm. Then, using the net-loss CVaR, the mean-risk model (15) with ρ = φβ is formulated
as
maximize
 , α
∑
k∈K
pk P(x, ξk)− λ
(
α +
1
1− β
∑
k∈K
pk [−P(x, ξk)− α ]+
)
subject to x ∈ X,
(28)
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which is equivalent to the linear program (LP):
maximize
 , α, ,, 
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i −
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Ei wk,i −
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Ui zk,i − λα− λ1− β
∑
k∈K
pk vk
subject to vk ≥ −
∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ei wk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ui zk,i − α, vk ≥ 0, k ∈ K,
wk,i ≥ xi − ξk,i, wk,i ≥ 0, k ∈ K, i ∈ N,
zk,i ≥ ξk,i − xi, zk,i ≥ 0, k ∈ K, i ∈ N,
x ∈ X.
(29)
Proposition 4.2 Let (x∗, α∗,v∗,w∗,z∗) be an optimal solution of (29). Then, (x∗, α∗) is also
optimal to (28), and the optimal values of both problems meet.
The minimization of the net-loss CVaR with an expected proﬁt constraint, i.e., (16) with ρ(x) =
φβ(x), is also transformed into an LP. The problem is formulated as follows:
minimize
 , α
α +
1
1− β
∑
k∈K
pk [−P(x, ξk)− α ]+
subject to
∑
k∈K
pk P(x, ξk) ≥ µ,
x ∈ X,
(30)
which is equivalent to the LP:
minimize
 , α,,, 
α +
1
1− β
∑
k∈K
pk vk
subject to
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i −
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Ei wk,i −
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈N
Ui zk,i ≥ µ,
vk ≥ −
∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ei wk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ui zk,i − α, vk ≥ 0, k ∈ K,
wk,i ≥ xi − ξk,i, wk,i ≥ 0, k ∈ K, i ∈ N,
zk,i ≥ ξk,i − xi, zk,i ≥ 0, k ∈ K, i ∈ N,
x ∈ X.
(31)
As easily guessed, the other variants using the total cost CVaR can be also transformed into
equivalent linear programs. In fact, only getting rid of the constant term, − ∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i, from the
constraint:
vk ≥ −
∑
i∈N
Vi ξk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ei wk,i +
∑
i∈N
Ui zk,i − α, vk ≥ 0, k ∈ K,
which is the ﬁrst constraint of Problem (29) and the second constraint of Problem (31), we can
obtain the two kinds of mean-risk models with the total cost CVaR.
The advantage of LP formulation is overwhelming since it can deal with a huge number of
constraints and variables, and consequently, it is expected to provide a well-approximating opti-
mal solution when any explicit solution cannot be achieved in such a case that many constraints
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on multiple products should be dealt with. In addition, even when one cannot achieve any closed
form solution, we can ﬁgure the distribution as a histogram in an approximate manner.
Figures 5 (a1) to (e2) show histograms of optimal distributions of the proﬁt P and total
cost Q via several models discussed above when single product is considered and one thousand
scenarios of its demand are drawn from a normal distribution N(150,452). In spite of the
normality of the demand distribution, every optimal distribution of proﬁt or total cost is much
skewed and, accordingly, diﬀerent from the normal one because of nonlinearity of the proﬁt or
the total cost. Also, we can observe some interesting diﬀerence among proposed and classical
models. From Figures (a1), (a2), (c1) and (c2), we see that the resulting optimal distributions
through the classical expected proﬁt maximization and the cost CVaR minimization show similar
shapes. From (b1), we see the net-loss CVaR minimization achieves an optimal proﬁt distribution
with small dispersion though it results in smaller expected or maximal proﬁt than the classical
solution or the cost CVaR minimizer. We note that the empirical probability that the daily proﬁt
becomes negative with net-loss CVaR is only 0.1% which corresponds to one scenario among
thousand, while the probability with the classical model is 1.4%. The mean-risk models achieve
the medium distribution of those through the mean maximization and the CVaR minimization.
Figure 6 shows the convex eﬃcient frontiers of the mean-net-loss CVaR model with diﬀerent
βs. Another advantage of the use of such LP formulations is eﬃcient computation of the frontier
by using the dual simplex algorithm. This fact helps a manager capture the proﬁt-CVaR trade-
oﬀ relation.
Figure 7 shows the CPU time spent in solving the LP with |N | = 3 and |K| = 1, 000, 750, 500
scenarios which are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution. Computation is conducted
on a personal computer with Pentium4 processor (1.6GHz) and 256M bite memory, and Xpress-
MP (ver.2003G) for Windows is used for solving linear programs. From the ﬁgure, we see that
the CPU time becomes smaller as β gets closer to 1.0. This fact provides a tailwind in practice
because from a viewpoint of risk management, large loss is often more concerned with, and large
β, say 0.95 or 0.99, should be thus taken.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we adopt two kinds of the conditional value-at-risk measures to the classical
single-period news-vendor problem. This measure captures a risk of the proﬁt going down to a
certain level in a predetermined signiﬁcance, and its minimization or related constraints have
a convex structure. It is shown that its convex structure plays an important role in seeking
optimal solutions to problems which include the CVaR measure in objective and constraints.
In particular, one can achieve a closed form solution in single-product case when no constraint
is imposed. Even with multiple constraints represented by a polyhedron, one can compute a
solution by solving a linear program, if distribution of demand is given by a ﬁnite number of
scenarios. By exploiting these computational advantages, we can apply this risk measure into
more complex problems.
The excess cost, QE := E[x − ξ]+, or the opportunity cost, QU := U [ξ − x]+, can be also
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applied as the loss L and preserve the convexity since these are convex functions with ﬁxed ξ.
Since there have been many extended researches of the news-vendor problem, applications of
the CVaR to various settings are future works.
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Figure 5: Histograms of Optimal Distributions of Proﬁt and Total Cost
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Figure 6: Eﬃcient Frontier of Mean-Net-Loss CVaR Model with Diﬀerent β
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Figure 7: Average CPU Time for Solving LP Formulation and β [sec.]
